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INTRODUCTION 
The outstanding essays and articles in this symposium and our discus-
sions at the conference itself raise a critical policy question: whether the 
time has come to take deregulation of the American legal profession seri-
ously. David Barnhizer argues that we should abandon our "Unethical Sys-
* Professor ofLaw, University ofTennessee College of Law. B.A. 1991, Haver-
ford College; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan. The Author gives special thanks to Brannon 
Denning, Thomas Morgan, Daniel D. Bamhizer, David Bamhizer, A viva Abramovsky, John 
Flood, Jack A. Guttenberg, Peter T. Hoffman, Joan W. Howarth, Dan Katz, Renee Newman 
Knake, Izabela Krasnicka, Blake Morant, Russell Pearce, Avrom Sherr, Steven R. Smith, 
Laurel S. Terry, Gordon Turriff, Alan C. Weinstein, the Michigan State University College 
of Law and the Michigan State Law Review for organizing the Lawyers as Conservators 
Symposium, Indya Kincannon, Jeff Hirsch, Alex Long, Jennifer Hendricks, Glenn Reynolds, 
Wendy Bach and the University of Tennessee College of Law for generous research support, 
and the Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz. 
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tern of Legal Ethics."1 Jack Guttenberg likewise asserts that the current sys-
tem of lawyer regulation is based upon outdated assumptions about the na-
ture of the profession and the practice. 2 Renee Knake challenges the consti-
tutionality of the American Bar Association (ABA) and state bar associa-
tions' ban on corporate ownership of law firms. 3 Paul Paton describes some 
of the regulatory changes in the U.S. and elsewhere and argues that regula-
tory change is inevitable.4 John Flood shares his experience of the U.K.'s 
large-scale deregulatory experiment. 5 
Taken together, these papers suggest that the American legal profes-
sion is facing a period of extraordinary strain and change and that deregula-
tion in part or in whole may finally be a realistic possibility. The U.K. per-
spective offers a vision of a different, and less regulated, market for Ameri-
can legal services. Flood's work makes clear that substantial deregulation of 
the market for legal services is not incompatible with a high-functioning and 
fair common-law justice system. To the contrary, the U.K. experience sug-
gests that some parts of the American system might be fairer if deregulatory 
measures were considered. 
This symposium's papers are a critical part of a broader academic dis-
cussion of deregulating the American legal profession. For example, the 
legal blog Truth on the Marketplace recently held an online symposium 
entitled Unlocking the Law: Deregulating the Legal Profession.6 I have sim-
ilarly argued in the past that the current regulation of American lawyers is 
exactly backwards--entry regulations are indefensibly high (suggesting that 
they are more useful to protecting existing lawyers than consumers) and 
conduct regulations are grossly under-enforced (suggesting that protecting 
existing lawyers is more important than protecting clients V 
There is a parallel discussion occurring on the same topic in a different 
field of study: economists are building their own argument for deregulation 
I. David Bamhizer, Abandoning an "Unethical" System of Legal Ethics, 2012 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 347. 
2. Jack A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law in the Twenty-First Century in a Twentieth 
(Nineteenth) Century Straightjacket: Something Has to Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 415. 
3. Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services: On the 
First Amendment Rights of Corporations and Individuals, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. I (2012). 
4. Paul D. Paton, Professor, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 
Panel at the Michigan State Law Review Symposium: Lawyers as Conservators (Sept. 8-9, 
2011). 
5. John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi? The Repercussions for the 
Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537. 
6. Unlocking the Law Symposium, TRUTH ON THE MARKET, 
http://truthonthemarket.com/unlocking-the-law-symposium/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
7. See Benjamin Room Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic 
Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 436-
63 (2001) [hereinafter Economic Analysis]; BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS 
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 140-59 (2011) [hereinafter LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS]. 
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of the legal profession and presenting their own empirical studies. The most 
notable example is a new book by three economists, Clifford Winston, Rob-
ert Crandall, and Vikram Maheshri, entitled First Thing We Do, Let's De-
regulate All the Lawyers.8 Their work follows in the path of previous eco-
nomic studies of the market for legal services.9 
It is unfortunate that these two discussions have been happening sim-
ultaneously, but separately. This Article seeks to (very briefly and selective-
ly) introduce the legal audience to the work of the economists, to discuss 
what parts of the economists' case for deregulation are most, and least, per-
suasive, and how these two discussions can be enriched by mutual recogni-
tion and interaction. Part I offers a very brief overview of the orthodox eco-
nomic take on occupational licensing and its application to American law-
yers. Part II uses Let's Deregulate to elucidate the strengths and weaknesses 
of the economists' take on lawyer deregulation. Part III continues this dis-
cussion by noting the special advantages and disadvantages economists 
bring to this project as outsiders-they can easily identify and disregard our 
professional shibboleths, but they also miss some important nuances in the 
nature of the profession and our regulation. The Article concludes by noting 
that more cross-pollination between economists and lawyers on this topic 
could prove extraordinarily helpful. 
I. ECONOMISTS ON THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSIONS 
As a general rule, economists have expressed a longstanding hostility 
to occupational regulation. The two most famous (and persuasive) examples 
come from Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations and Milton Friedman's 
Capitalism and Freedom. 
A. Wealth of Nations 
The Wealth of Nations was first published in 1776 and is one of the 
foundational works in classical economics, as well as one of the most pow-
erful and lasting defenses of the superiority of free markets. 10 One of 
Smith's main targets in The Wealth of Nations was the European policy 
allocating an "exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade," what we now 
8. CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W. CRANDALL & VIKRAM MAHESHRI, FIRST THING 
WE DO, LET'S DEREGULATE ALL THE LA WYERS (2011) [hereinafter LET'S DEREGULATE). 
9. See, e.g., Mario Pagliero, Licensing Exam Difficulty and Entry Salaries in the 
US Market for Lawyers, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 726 (2010); B. Peter Pashigian, The Market 
for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
53 (1977) [hereinafter Market for Lawyers]. 
10. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Modem Library Paperback ed. 2000) 
(1776). 
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refer to as occupational regulation/licensing.'' In pre-industrial revolution 
Europe this regulation was generally accomplished by professional guilds, 
which limited admission to those who had served as apprentices. The guilds 
also limited the total number of apprentices and the length of apprentice-
ship, effectively restraining the number of entrants into any regulated pro-
fession.12 
Smith lays out three ills associated with this occupational regulation: 
First, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number 
than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them; secondly, by increasing it in 
others beyond what it naturally would be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the free cir-
culation of labour and stock, both from employment to employment and from place 
to place. 13 
Smith's argument includes both a moral/libertarian element and an 
explicitly economic one. On a moral level, occupational regulation violates 
the "property which every man has in his own labour"; this property "is the 
original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and invio-
lable."'4 On a purely economic level, these regulations reduce competition 
and are meant to prevent a "reduction in price, and consequently of wages 
and profit, by restraining ... free competition."15 
Smith likewise denies the necessity for the regulation, arguing that the 
"institution of long apprenticeships can give no security that insufficient 
workmanship shall not frequently be exposed to public sale."16 Lastly, 
Smith states quite pithily how and why these regulations arise: "People of 
the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contriv-
ance to raise prices."17 
In short, roughly 235 years ago Adam Smith stated the basic critique 
of occupational regulation with great prescience and clarity. The later eco-
nomic critiques all bear the basic imprint of Smith's work. 
B. Capitalism and Freedom and the Current Critique 
Chapter Nine of Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom is the 
other foundational text18 for the economic critique of occupational licens-
II. /d. at 136. 
12. !d. at 137-41. 
13. /d. at 136. 
14. /d. at 140. 
15. !d. at 142. 
16. !d. at 140. 
17. /d.at148. 
18. Note that this is an extremely condensed recap. Other foundational texts include 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 941,966-67 (1963); Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly 
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ing. 19 Like The Wealth ofNations, Capitalism and Freedom is a forceful and 
readable defense of free markets and a powerful critique of government 
regulation in general. 
Like The Wealth of Nations, Friedman launches his critique with an 
explicit libertarian appeal to freedom of labor and a rebuke of the medieval 
guild system, arguing that the "overthrow of the medieval guild system was 
an indispensible early step in the rise of freedom in the Western World" and 
that the "retrogression" back to licensure in the twentieth century has been 
enormously harmful. 20 
Before attacking the economic effects of licensure, Friedman notes a 
disturbing "common featurem 1 of licensure: "the legislation" establishing 
licensure is generally "enacted on behalf of[the] producer group"22 and then 
governed by the group itself.23 The regulation eventually ossifies into pow-
erful barriers to entry and monopoly rents for the licensed profession, with 
little or no accompanying benefit to the public.24 Friedman argues against 
licensing physicians/5 with sideswipes at barbers26 and lawyers27 along the 
way. 
Economists have built upon these arguments to present a powerful 
case against occupationallicensing.28 The case begins with the logic of col-
lective action: concentrated groups that have a large per capita stake in gov-
in American Medicine, 21 J.L. & ECON. 165, 185-86 (1978) (examining economic perspec-
tives of physician licensure); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL 
J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 13-17 (1971) (describing licensing and the collective political 
power of an occupation); OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATIONS (S. Rottenberg ed., 
1980) (collecting a number of other important economic works on licensure). 
19. MILTON FRJEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1982) [hereinafter 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM]. Friedman actually wrote his dissertation on occupational licens-
ing, so Chapter Nine of Capitalism and Freedom is a greatly condensed version of his 
thoughts on the topic. See MILTON FRJEDMAN & SIMON KUZNETS, INCOME FROM 
INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE ( 1945) (Friedman's dissertation). 
20. CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 19, at 137. 
21. /d. at 139 ("The common feature of these examples, as well as of licensure, is 
that the legislation is enacted on behalf of a producer group."). 
22. !d. 
23. !d. at 140. 
24. !d. at 140-60. 
25. /d. at 149-60. 
26. /d. at 142-43. 
27. !d. at !53. 
28. For studies showing higher costs to consumers from occupational licensing, see 
AM. Ass'N OF RETIRED PERS, CONSUMER AFFAIRS SECTION, UNREASONABLE REGULATION= 
UNREASONABLE PRICES (1986) (considering optometry, dentistry, hearing aid sales, and 
funeral sales); Alex Maurizi, Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL. 
EcoN. 399 (1974). See generally Simon Rottenberg, Introduction, in OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSURE AND REGULATION I, 3 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980); J. Howard Beales, III, The 
Economics of Regulating the Professions, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS: A PUBLIC 
POLICY SYMPOSIUM 125, 135 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980). 
498 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:493 
emment regulation tend to do much better than diffuse groups with low per 
capita costs, even if the second group is much larger than the first and even 
if the aggregate cost to society is quite high. 29 Thus, every industry or occu-
pation that has enough political power will seek to utilize the state's power 
to assist its business, either through direct subsidies, price-fixing, barriers to 
entry, or through suppression of competing industries.30 
Professions are the quintessential concentrated interest group, so they 
tend to triumph in both the political and regulatory processes. Barriers to 
entry, which make it harder for new competitors to enter the market and 
thus inflate the wages of current practitioners, are the prime example.31 
C. Application of This Framework to Lawyers 
The Smith/Friedman story about the nature of occupational licensure 
has been applied to lawyers. Economists32 and law professors alike have 
argued that the many barriers to entry to the legal profession-the require-
ment ofundergraduate education, the law school requirement (and the vari-
ous American Bar Association sub-requirements involving law libraries, 
faculties, etc.), the character and fitness process, and the bar exam (and oth-
er MPRE type exams)-are unjustifiably high and harmful to the public.33 
29. The classic statement of this effect is MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 22-52 (1965) (describing 
the dominance of small groups over large groups in the political and regulatory process). 
30. For another seminal work in the area, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Eco-
nomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 6 (1971) ("Crudely put, the butter pro-
ducers wish to suppress margarine and encourage the production of bread."). 
31. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 59-60 (1982). 
32. See Market for Lawyers, supra note 9, at 80-81 (concluding that law schools 
have undersupplied lawyers for market demand, and that lawyer wages have been inflated as 
a result); B. Peter Pashigian, The Number and Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings, 
1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 51 (1978) [hereinafter Number and Earnings]; D. S. LEES, 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROFESSIONS 35-45 ( 1966) (examining the British legal 
market). But see Malcolm Getz et al., Competition at the Bar: The Correlation Between the 
Bar Examination Pass Rate and the Profitability of Practice, 67 VA. L. REV. 863 (1981) 
(concluding that bar exam pass rates do not have an effect on the salaries oflawyers). 
33. For some of my work on the subject, see Economic Analysis, supra note 7, at 
434-63; see also LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS, supra note 7, at 140-54. For seminal works by others, 
see, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 97-98 (1981) 
(arguing against the restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law); DAVID LUBAN, 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, AN ETHICAL STUDY 269 (1988) (proposing "to deregulate, wholly or 
partially, the market for routine legal services-wills, probate, real estate closings, uncon-
tested divorces, and so forth-by allowing non-lawyers and paralegals to perform them"); W. 
Clark Durant, Maximizing Access to Justice: A Challenge to the Legal Profession, in 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY 
AND REGULATION 432, 437 (2d ed. 1988). 
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The argument against lawyer regulation is both theoretical and histori-
cal. As a historical matter, as of the middle of the nineteenth century, dereg-
ulation of the legal profession was widespread/4 and bar associations large-
ly defunct. 35 Beginning in the 1870s, lawyers began to form organized bar 
associations,36 including the nascent ABA.37 From the outset, the new bar 
associations had a regulatory mission, to punish the "activities of a notori-
ous fringe of unlicensed practitioners"38 and require higher qualifications for 
admission to practice. 39 
A brief review of the current barriers to entry establishes the success 
of this project: new entrants must generally complete at least three years of 
undergraduate education (and many states and law schools require a de-
gree), must graduate from an ABA accredited law school, and must pass a 
particular state's bar examination and character and fitness examinations.40 
These entry barriers are expensive monetarily and temporally, and there is 
ample evidence that the expense to the public is not worth the benefit. The 
easiest way to demonstrate this point is consideration of the skills of the 
newest members of the bar. Query what legal tasks, if any, we could guar-
antee that a lawyer could perform on the day she is sworn in.41 
II. LET'S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS 
Let's Deregulate is the most recent application of the economic argu-
ment for occupational deregulation to the American legal profession.42 The 
34. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 227-28 
( 1953) ("In 1800 a definite period of preparation for admission to the bar was prescribed in 
fourteen of the nineteen states or organized territories which then made up the Union. In 
1840 it was required in but eleven out of thirty jurisdictions. In 1860 it had come to be re-
quired in only nine of the then thirty-nine jurisdictions."). 
35. Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal 
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REv. 453,461 (2008) [hereinafter Judges]. 
36. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 648-52 (2d ed. 1985) 
[hereinafter HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW]. 
37. ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 
207-08 (1921). ABA founded in 1878 in Saratoga, New York, by "seventy-five gentlemen 
from twenty-one jurisdictions, out of approximately 60,000 lawyers then practicing in the 
United States." !d. at 208. 
38. See HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 36, at 650. 
39. See W. Hamilton Bryson & E. Lee Shepard, The Virginia Bar, 1870-1900, in 
THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 171-72 (Gerald W. Gawalt, 
ed. 1984). 
40. LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS, supra note 7, at 121-22. 
41. For a much fuller version of this argument, see Benjamin H. Barton, An Institu-
tional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, 
Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1190 & n.80 (2003). 
42. See LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8. 
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book argues that lawyers earn an inflated wage through two different types 
of government regulations. 
First, lawyers have pushed for high barriers to entry, thus restricting 
the overall supply of lawyers and keeping many new competitors out of the 
profession.43 This argument is familiar and dates back to at least Adam 
Smith. Nevertheless, the book offers a powerful new addition to the argu-
ment; it offers the most thorough and rigorous empirical demonstration of a 
measurable earnings premium for lawyers.44 These sections of Let's De-
regulate are discussed in Section II.A below. 
Second, lawyers have pushed to affect the demand for legal services 
by lobbying for complicated laws and regulations in "contentious policy 
areas," like "environmental standards governing pollution emissions and 
discharges" or "the resolution of intellectual property disputes" or "class-
action liability suits."45 This portion of the analysis states a newer critique of 
the legal profession; the bulk of the study of government regulation and 
lawyer incomes has focused on barriers to entry. The relationship of lawyer 
income to legal complexity is, in fact, a burgeoning and fascinating topic of 
study.46 Nevertheless, this part of the analysis is weaker because the causal 
link between the behavior of lawyers as an interest group and the allegedly 
harmful government regulation is much weaker. These sections of Let's 
Deregulate are discussed in Section II.B. 
The comparison of these two different grounds helps establish the spe-
cial strengths and weaknesses that economists bring to the debate over the 
regulation of lawyers. Let's Deregulate offers a clear view of the valuable 
contributions that economists can make to the discussion of deregulating the 
legal profession. Most notably, economists are able to estimate the costs and 
benefits oflicensure.47 This adds empirical meat to the bones ofthe common 
sense argument against licensure made by Smith and Friedman. 
Of course the devil is in the details and what exactly one counts as a 
cost and a benefit of lawyer licensure determines how the balance comes 
out. As a result, it is particularly important that an argument for deregula-
tion be conservative (small "c" conservative) and built on generally agreed 
to principles. 
Unfortunately, the second half of Let's Deregulate's argument suffers 
from gross over-reach. It is one thing to extrapolate from demonstrably true 
propositions, for example, the requirements for entering the legal profession 
43. !d. at 9-14. 
44. /d. at 24-56. 
45. !d. at 14-15. 
46. My thoughts on the nature of legal complexity and the roles that lawyers and 
judges play in creating and maintaining that complexity can be found in LAWYER-JUDGE 
BIAS, supra note 7, at 259-83. 
47. See LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 73-75. 
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are very expensive48 or that more people would like to enter the legal pro-
fession than are allowed to (limiting the supply of legal services and in-
creasing the cost).49 It is a different matter to argue that lawyers have suc-
cessfully lobbied for complex regulations in an effort to drive up their sala-
ries.50 The causes, costs, and benefits of environmental regulation are too 
varied and complicated to boil down to just their effect on the legal profes-
sion. Moreover, the idea that lawyers are the prime movers behind these 
regulations is, to put it kindly, a challenging empirical proposition. 51 
A. Strengths of the Economic Approach 
The best part of Let's Deregulate (and the economic approach in gen-
eral) is also the most straightforward. The authors demonstrate that barriers 
to entry result in fewer lawyers and that this reduced supply likely results in 
higher salaries for lawyers. First, the authors succinctly describe how ex-
pensive it is to become a lawyer and how the barriers to entry constrain the 
number of lawyers. 52 The authors correctly identify law schools as the pri-
mary bottleneck: 
Given that 95 percent of people who enroll in an AHA-accredited law school even-
tually pass a state bar examination, the primary factor that limits the supply of law-
yers in the United States is clearly the number of available spaces in [law] schools. 
Indeed, the number of applicants to U.S. law schools has risen more than 50 per-
cent since 1976, while total enrollments have increased only 26 percent. 53 
Existing law schools have failed to expand to meet the demand out of 
concern for the U.S. News and World Report rankings and a desire to main-
tain the highest quality student pool. 54 The ABA has suppressed the creation 
of new schools through the expensive and intensive accreditation process. 55 
48. See generally id. at 9-14 (noting that the cost to attend a three-year program at 
some institutions to exceed $150,000). 
49. !d. at 11-12 (noting that from 1997 to 2004 approximately 50% of law school 
applicants were not admitted to any law school). 
50. !d. at 14-16. 
51. See infra Section II.B. 
52. LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 9-14. 
53. !d. at 12. 
54. !d. at 12-13; see also Market for Lawyers, supra note 9, at 60-61 (noting that 
non-profit, high quality law schools have little incentive to expand to meet increased student 
and market demand); MICHAEL SAUDER & WENDY ESPELAND, FEAR OF FALLING: THE 
EFFECTS OF US. NEWS & WORLD REPORT RANKINGS ON U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 11-14 (2007), 
available at http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/Research/GRIGR-07-02.pdf (describing ef-
fects ofthe rankings on admissions criteria and decisions). 
55. LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 12-14. 
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As a result, approximately fifty percent of the potential entrants to the mar-
ket are deterred each year. 56 
Next, Let's Deregulate demonstrates how reduced supply results in 
higher wages. American lawyer salaries are. compared to other licensed and 
unlicensed jobs, and lawyers are found to enjoy a significant salary premi-
um (second only to doctors). 57 This premium increased between 1975 and 
2004.58 
An earlier study of lawyer salaries by Sherman Rosen posited that the 
bulk of this premium was due to the skills and/or abilities oflawyers.59 Let's 
Deregulate seeks to rebut this concept by noting that the average LSA T and 
GP A of entering law students has not changed significantly over the studied 
period (suggesting that lawyers themselves have remained intrinsically 
similar) and that the salary premium of lawyers has grown over time, while 
other skill intensive professions like engineers or doctors have experienced 
relatively stable premiums (suggesting that the increased lawyer premium is 
not the result of the acquisition of specialized skills). 60 
Let's Deregulate concludes that "the United States is spending $170 
billion a year on lawyers (in 2005 dollars)" and the "2004 lawyers' earnings 
premiums amounted to $64 billion-or an eye-popping $71,000 per practic-
ing lawyer-and that those premiums were widely shared among the legal 
profession."61 The authors provide extensive data to support this conclu-
sion.62 Even if the absolute figure is rejected, the conclusion that barriers to 
entry have raised lawyer salaries is patent and inescapable. 
There are some points in the analysis that are worth quibbling with. 
Notably, a great deal of the study covers the years 1974-2004,63 which is a 
somewhat inopportune set of years, as the late 1970s and early 1980s were a 
particularly challenging time for legal profession earnings in comparison to 
the 1960s or the late-1980s.64 The current period (from 2005-2011) has 
likewise been rougher than 1984-2004.65 The time period matters because 
56. /d. at 11 (dating from 1997 to 2004 roughly half of the 800,000 applicants to 
American law schools were not admitted to any law school). 
57. Id at 37, 39. 
58. See generally id. at 30-56. 
59. Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J. L & ECON. 215,216-18 (1992). 
60. See generally LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 45-55. 
61. /d. at 55. 
62. See generally id. at 24-55. 
63. See id. at 16-22. 
64. Rosen, supra note 59, at 234-38. 
65. See, e.g., Salary Distribution Curve for the Class of 2009 Shows Relatively Few 
Salaries Were Close to the Mean, NAT'L Ass'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (July 2010), 
http://www.nalp.org/startingsalarydistributionclassof2009; Starting Salary Distribution for 
Class of 2008 More Dramatic than Previous Years, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW 
PLACEMENT (June 2009), http://www.nalp.org/08saldistribution?s=starting%20salary%20 
distribution%20for%20class%20ot%202008. 
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some of the argument is based on an increase in the salary premium over 
time, so choosing a relative trough to start the analysis and a relative peak to 
end it makes the analysis weaker than if it had covered a longer and more 
inclusive period of time. 66 
Nevertheless, the book is the most comprehensive and authoritative 
empirical argument about the costs of entry regulation for lawyers to date. It 
is thus of a piece with the best of the economic scholarship on this topic: it 
uses the available data and statistical analysis to support an otherwise com-
mon-sense hypothesis-restricting entry raises prices unjustifiably. 
B. Weaknesses-Policy Arguments Disguised as Empirical Arguments 
Two of the authors of Let's Deregulate, Clifford Winston and Robert 
Crandall, have proven controversial figures in the past-famously arguing 
in 2003 "that the current empirical record of antitrust enforcement is weak" 
and as a result, enforcement actions should be limited to "only the most 
egregious anticompetitive violations."67 Opposing scholars accused Winston 
and Crandall of overreach and harshly criticized the paper's empirical and 
policy bases.68 
I am not in a position to dispute their conclusions about antitrust, but 
can report that half of the argument in Let's Deregulate is unsustainable as 
an empirical matter. The authors' argument on the supply side of the equa-
tion (there are fewer lawyers than there would be otherwise due to entry 
barriers) is quite persuasive. The authors' demand side argument that gov-
ernment regulation is a significant source of inflated lawyer salaries and that 
lawyers as an interest group have successfully lobbied for increased regula-
tion, is off the mark. 
Let's Deregulate argues that "the demand for lawyers in the public 
and private sector has experienced continual growth, thanks in part to gov-
ernment policies that require private firms to retain legal counsel or encour-
age them to engage in litigation.'>69 The authors "focus on a subset of the 
most important and contentious policy areas that help generate greater de-
66. For example, Pashigian's studies started in the 1920s and continued to the publi-
cation date. See Market for Lawyers, supra note 9, at 63-67; Number and Earnings, supra 
note 32, at 67-77. 
67. Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Con-
sumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 3-4 (2003). 
68. See. e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSPS. 27 (2003); Gregory J. Werden, The Effect of Antitrust Policy on Consumer Welfare: 
What Crandall and Winston Overlook, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY 
STUDIES (Apr. 2004), available at http:// aei.brookings.org/admin!authorpdfs/ 
page.php?id=933. 
69. LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 14 (emphasis omitted). 
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mand for attorneys and their services."70 These include "environmental 
standards governing pollution emissions," "the resolution of intellectual 
property disputes," "class-actions suits," and state "consumer protection 
acts.'m 
The authors' frontal assault on much of the recent law and regulation 
protecting consumers and the environment is obviously controversial and 
less empirically demonstrable. Nevertheless, in order to connect their policy 
attack on this regulation to lawyers, the authors are required to "double 
down" on their shaky foundation with two further logical leaps. 
First, they must argue that the costs associated with these policies 
outweigh the benefits.72 This is enormously problematic, because any argu-
ment against government regulation or consumer protection lawsuits is a 
complicated one that will not gamer general agreement on either the costs 
or benefits, let alone their effect on a totally separate area of the economy 
(the demand for legal services). This is a topic that has been widely debated 
among the public and economists73 and is not suitable to a brief overview as 
part of ninety-nine page book.74 
Second, in order to connect these regulations into the legal profession, 
the authors attempt to prove that as an interest group the legal profession 
has successfully lobbied hard for these regulations and others. 75 Let's De-
regulate does admit that "[i]t is difficult to provide systematic quantitative 
evidence of lawyers' influence in generating or maintaining specific ineffi-
cient public policies that are solely or partly intended to benefit them," but 
then goes on to provide "circumstantial evidence," in the form of a collec-
tion of anecdotes about lawyers lobbying legislatures. 76 
It is certainly true that the ABA and the various state bar associations 
are powerful lobbying entities.77 It is likewise true that the ABA played a 
large role in the legislative successes the authors describe as well as many 
70. /d. 
71. /d. at 14-16. 
72. See id. at 67-72. 
73. See, e.g., Jane S. Shaw & Richard L. Stroup, Do Environmental Regulations 
Increase Economic Efficiency?, 23 REG. 13 (1990); Lisa Heinzerling & Fred Ackerman, 
Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, GEO. ENVIRO. L. 
POL'Y INST. (2002), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/c-
b%20pamphlet%20final.pdf; Robert Stavins, Is Benefit-Cost Analysis Helpful for Environ-
mental Regulation?, ROBERT STAVINS BLOG (July 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2009/07/08/is-benefit-cost-analysis-helpful-for-
environmental-regulation/. 
74. LET's DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 65-81 presents this argument. 
75. /d. at 75-81. 
76. /d. 
77. /d. 
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others they overlook.78 It is a completely other matter to argue that policies 
as diverse as environmental regulation or consumer protection are in any 
way "caused" by lawyers. These sorts of policies are inevitably the result of 
large and shifting political alliances, not any single group. 
Further, previous economic scholarship and some of the authors' own 
data fails to support their contentions. Prior to Let's Deregulate a trio of 
articles by Peter Pashigian were the authoritative statement on the main 
impetus for the rise in lawyer salaries. 79 Pashigian agrees with Let's Deregu-
-late that as a result of entry barriers lawyer salaries are higher than would 
otherwise be expected.80 Pashigian, however, expressly rejects the hypothe-
sis that increased regulation increases lawyer earnings. 81 Pashigian con-
cludes that increases in real gross national product drive both the quantity 
and remuneration of lawyers, not increases in regulation.82 Pashigian does 
conclude that regulatory changes may drive the allocation of lawyers, but 
not the absolute quantity or payment.83 
Likewise, Let's Deregulate actually makes an unwitting case against 
the effect of regulation upon lawyer salaries. First, doctors consistently earn 
a greater and more consistent income premium than lawyers over the study 
period.84 There is no reason to believe that doctors are influenced or helped 
by increased regulation. To the contrary, it seems likely that doctors' earn-
ings have been dampened by government regulation.85 
Second, economists have seen a similar rise in salary premiums to 
lawyers. 86 The authors attempt to connect this rise to "economists' growing 
interactions with the legal profession."87 This assertion comes with little 
78. Much of my scholarship has focused on the power of the ABA and state bar 
lobbying efforts. See, e.g., BARTON, supra note 7, at 105-59. 
79. See Number and Earnings, supra note 32; Market for Lawyers, supra note 9; B. 
Peter Pashigian, Regulation, Preventive Law, and the Duties of Attorneys, in THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY 3 (William J. Carney, ed. 1982) [hereinafter Duties of 
Attorneys]. These studies were reprised and updated by symposium participant Thomas D. 
Morgan in 1994. See Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 
69 WASH. L. REV. 625 (1994). 
80. See Market for Lawyers, supra note 9, at 80-85 (concluding that law schools 
have undersupplied lawyers for market demand, and that lawyer wages have been inflated as 
a result). 
81. See Number and Earnings, supra note 9, at 77-81; Market for Lawyers, supra 
note 32, at 70-73. 
82. See Number and Earnings, supra note 9, at 77-81; Market for Lawyers, supra 
note 32, at 70-73. 
83. See Duties of Attorneys, supra note 79, at 41-42. 
84. See LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 37-39. 
85. Consider, for example, the various cuts to Medicare and Medicaid payouts. For 
the most recent round of cuts, see Robert Pear, Obama Proposes $320 Billion in Medicare 
and Medicaid Cuts over 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,2011, at Al4. 
86. LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 61-65. 
87. !d. at 65. 
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empirical evidence to suggest that the rise in the salaries of economists has 
been as a result of working for lawyers, rather than the likelier explanation: 
economists are now performing more lucrative work in the private sector 
rather than teaching.88 The brief section where the authors discuss the rise in 
economist salaries (a phenomenon likely to be near and dear to the authors' 
hearts) and treat it as a side effect of the regulatory imbalances in the legal 
profession is particularly unfortunate and telling: the authors seem unwilling 
to consider any data points that disagree with their analysis, especially when 
arguing the insalubrious effects of government regulations. 
III. THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVE-WHAT ECONOMISTS TEND TO 
GET RIGHT AND WHAT ECONOMISTS MISS 
Economists have the advantages and disadvantages of being outsiders 
when considering the legal market. The outsider advantage allows them to 
disregard some sacred cows that lack empirical foundation. The disad-
vantage to outsider status is that economists miss some underlying nuances. 
A. Advantage Outsiders 
Economists offer an outside and generally unbiased view of the legal 
profession, unencumbered by professional jargon or mythology. Having 
presented my argument for deregulation to many legal audiences over the 
years, I can report that lawyers, law professors, and judges are quite in-
sistent that barriers to entry need to rise, not lower, because of the poor 
practice they regularly witness and as a protection against the potential hor-
rors for clients from the unauthorized practice of law or multidisciplinary 
practice.89 These propositions are typically offered with only anecdotal em-
pirical support. 
An outsider is able to cut through these arguments more quickly and 
cleanly than a fellow lawyer. Let's Deregulate, for example, offers a brisk 
and concise six-page refutation of the policy justifications for entry barriers. 
The author's note that "no evidence exists to justify the ABA's initial ac-
creditation policies" and that the "weak discipline on lawyers' conduct" 
88. /d. at 65. 
89. Milton Friedman tells an illustrative anecdote. A fellow economist was arguing 
to a group of lawyers that entry barriers were too high and 
used an analogy from the automotive industry. Would it not, he said, be absurd if 
the automobile industry were to argue that no one should drive a low quality car 
and therefore that no automobile manufacturer should be permitted to produce a 
car that did not come up to the Cadillac standard. One member of the audience rose 
and approved the analogy, saying that, of course, the country cannot afford any-
thing but Cadillac lawyers! This tends to be the professional attitude. 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 19, at 153. 
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calls "into question much of the justification for licensure regimes."90 They 
further note that based on the admissions profile of the students denied ad-
mission to any school there are qualified applicants being denied admis-
sion.91 Most importantly, the purchasers of the complicated legal services 
that are most likely to require special training or abilities tend to be either 
the government or law firms, and these purchasers are especially well quali-
fied to sort the substandard from the excellent_practitioners. This is especial-
ly so in light of the current high level of information on individual law-
yers.92 Given the authors' earlier strong description of the costs of the sys-
tem, their evisceration of the benefits is particularly effective. 
B. Disadvantage Outsiders 
There are three main nuances that Let's Deregulate and other econom-
ic studies of the legal profession tend to miss. First, it makes intuitive sense 
that as the law grows more complex the demand for lawyers will rise, as 
firms will be forced to pay more ex ante to comply with the law and more 
ex post to defend law suits or government prosecutions based on violations 
of unclear legal standards.93 These claims are difficult to prove empirically 
(partially because "complexity" itself is a tricky and potentially immeasura-
ble attribute), but have a theoretical appeal.94 I have likewise argued that 
legal complexity is a tremendous advantage to the legal profession in terms 
of both work creation and job satisfaction.95 
Nevertheless, the insider view of complexity includes the recognition 
that judges are prime actors in the drama and that lawyers and judges work 
together in a common-law, precedential system to create layers upon layers 
of complexity on top of regulations, statutes, and the existing common 
90. LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 83-84. 
91. /d. at 84-85. 
92. !d. at 86-88. 
93. Gillian Hadfield's work in this area has been particularly strong. See Gillian K. 
Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000). 
94. Humorously, the various scholars who have addressed legal complexity fre-
quently come up with relatively convoluted definitions of complexity itself. For example, 
Peter Schuck describes legal complexity across four axes-density, complexity, institutional 
differentiation, and indeterminacy. Peter H. Schuck,. Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Con-
sequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. I, 4 (I 992). Deborah Paul uses three criteria- compli-
cation, intractability, and incoherence. Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: 
How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REv. 151, 157-62 
( 1997). Richard Epstein offers a definition that defines complexity in terms of the public and 
private costs of compliance with any rule. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A 
COMPLEX WORLD 25-26 (1995). 
95. BARTON, supra note 7, at 259-83. 
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law.96 Both Let's Deregulate and earlier discussions of the effects of regula-
tion on the legal profession focus solely on legislative action and regulation 
by agencies acting under legislative authority.97 This puts Let's Deregulate 
in the awkward position of trying to link lawyer regulation, bar associations, 
and the legislation itself into a causal chain. The authors miss, however, a 
much easier and clearer causal chain: the way that judges and lawyers work 
together to create complexity in case law. When trying cases, lawyers do 
not have to lobby unsympathetic legislators for added complexity, they 
simply need to convince like-minded appellate judges who have their own 
reasons to favor complexity.98 
Second, Let's Deregulate makes a similar error in describing the histo-
ry of lawyer regulation; it assumes that the history of the growth in entry 
regulations has been as a result of ABA lobbying of state legislatures.99 This 
understanding of how professions generate entry barriers is correct, of 
course, for every profession except lawyers. The difference for lawyers is 
that state supreme courts have taken the leading role in regulation as a con-
stitutional matter. 100 This has resulted in quite a different story of self-
serving regulation, because lawyers have an easier time lobbying state su-
preme court justices (and the public is virtually barred from lobbying them) 
and because by definition these justices are all former lawyers themselves, 
and thus naturally more sympathetic. 101 This oversight is more than just a 
lost nuance; it shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the 
regulation itself, which weakens the entire project. 
Lastly, Let's Deregulate fails to notice that there are currently two dif-
ferent legal professions in the United States and that deregulation would 
likely affect one much more than the other. Take a look at this graph that 
shows a bimodal distribution of lawyer incomes: 102 
96. /d. 
97. See Market for Lawyers, supra note 9, at 53-54; LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 
8, at 59-67. 
98. Judges have powerful incentives to favor complexity as well: they enjoy the 
process and it allows them freedom to follow their internal preferences while still appearing 
to follow precedent. BARTON, supra note 7, at 271-77. 
99. LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 2-3; see a/so CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 
supra note 19, at 151-52 (asserting that lawyers have been less successful in generating entry 
barriers than doctors because many state legislators were graduates of night law schools). 
I 00. Judges, supra note 35, at 461-65. 
101. See BARTON, supra note 7, at 132-40 (providing a longer version of this argu-
ment). 
I 02. Bill Henderson reprints this graph on the Empirical Legal Studies Blog as part of 
an exceptionally helpful and perceptive post. See Bill Henderson, Distribution of 2006 Start-
ing Salaries: Best Graphic Chart of the Year, EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Sept. 4, 2007, 3:29 
PM), http:/ /www.elsblog.org/the _ empirical_legal_ studi/2007 /09/distribution-of.html? 
cid=138813146. 
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The traditional graph for a labor market is a bell curve, with the medi-
an salary at the top of the curve. 103 A bimodal distribution is unusual and 
speaks volumes about the current nature of the U.S. legal market-there are 
in fact two separate legal professions, high-end law firm work on the right 
side of the graph and government and small firm work on the left side of the 
graph. 
Because of the salary valley between the two types of practice, it is 
unlikely that deregulation of entry would change much for large law firm 
practices. 104 This is partially because the market for these services is already 
very competitive and crosses international borders. 105 There is also signifi-
103. See Greg Mankiw, Bimodality, GREG MANKIW'S BLOG (July 10, 2008), 
http:/Jgregmankiw.blogspotcom/2008/07/bimodality.html. 
104. Although the pressures of globalization and the recession are a different matter 
altogether. For a masterful (and short) description of these changes, see William D. Hender-
son & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession-
And It May Be a Sign of Lasting Change, ABA J. (July 1, 2011, 3:40 AM CST), 
http://www .abajoumaLcom/magazine/article/paradigm _shift/. 
105. For some studies of the internationalization of big firm practice, see J.V. Bea-
verstock et aL, Geographies of Globalization: United States Law Firms in World Cities, 21 
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cant competition among lawyers and law students to join these firms. As 
such, it is unlikely that even if entry deregulation allowed an influx of new 
lawyers into the practice that these (presumably less qualified) lawyers 
would displace current big firm lawyers or in house counsel. 106 Deregulation 
of multidisciplinary practice and allowing lawyers, economists, accountants, 
and management consultants to work together, however, might result in 
lower salaries for lawyers in these firms, as lower paid non-lawyers swal-
lowed some of the most lucrative work, 107 but this may be occurring regard-
less.108 
In fact, the authors' insistence on connecting the salary of lawyers to 
the amount and nature of government regulation may be an attempt to an-
swer to this critique-the salaries at the top end of the distribution scale 
(which show the largest earnings premiums) will be unlikely to be affected 
by a flood of low-end entrants into the market. 109 As such, the best way to 
explain the salaries at the top end of the distribution scale is to point to gov-
ernment regulation rather than concluding that those salaries are a fair result 
of global competition and/or the intrinsic skills/attributes of these lawyers. 110 
Nevertheless, Let's Deregulate glosses over a simpler answer. In a 
global legal marketplace clients are willing to pay a premium for the best 
representation in high stakes corporate or litigation matters. They are espe-
cially willing to pay top dollar for that rarest of legal commodities: genuine 
insight. 111 As long as these skills and abilities are valued, changes in entry 
barriers would be unlikely to affect the salaries of the big firm lawyers and 
in-house counsel. 
URB. GEOGRAPHY 95 (2000); Andrew Jones, More than 'Managing Across Borders?' The 
Complex Role of Face-to-Face Interaction in Globalizing Law Firms, 7 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 
223 (2007); Barney Warf & Chand Wije, The Spatial Structure of Large U.S. Law Firms, 22 
GROWTH & CHANGE !57 (1991). 
106. Let's Deregulate does recognize this possibility, but argues that deregulation 
would be beneficial regardless. LET'S DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 97. 
107. See Gillian Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost 
of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1717-27 
(2008). 
I 08. See Henderson, supra note I 02. 
109. Cf LET's DEREGULATE, supra note 8, at 40-41 (noting that the income premiums 
in the top quartile are the highest and are harder to explain as a result of entry barriers). 
II 0. !d. at 59-71. 
Ill. Cf Jay Shepherd, Competing by Raising Prices, TIMELESSLY (May 25, 2010), 
http://www.clientrevolution.com/in-house-counseU (noting that new pricing schema for 
lawyers does not necessarily mean lower prices, clients will pay more for especially valuable 
or insightful legal advice). 
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CONCLUSION 
Hopefully this discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the econ-
omists' argument for lawyer deregulation brings home the importance of 
cross dialogue on this topic. Economists bring a special set of tools to the 
problem and the strength of few pre-conceived notions. Lawyers bring a 
nitty-gritty, insider knowledge of the subject that can enrich the economists' 
view. Hopefully more cross-pollination will occur as the argument for de-
regulation broadens and reaches both legal and general interest audiences. 

